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Indian Trade Lawyers
and the Building of State Trade-Related Legal Capacity
by
Gregory Shaffer, James Nedumpara, and Aseema Sinha1

Introduction
The law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is not autonomous. It shapes and is
shaped. It affects not only countries’ trade and tariff policies, but also shapes their laws,
regulations and institutions. In particular, it creates new accountability mechanisms with
particular normative frames, and opens markets creating new demand for professional expertise,
such as legal expertise. The WTO institutionalizes capitalism, and thus provides opportunities
directly and indirectly for business lawyers. Yet it does not do so in a uniform manner. Rather,
nation-states, working with private constituents, negotiate the terms of WTO law and shape its
meaning, whether directly through engagement, or indirectly through lack of engagement.
The WTO should not be viewed as static and deterministic, autonomously affecting
states. Rather, the WTO legal order is shaped by those who negotiate its terms and who
participate in their interpretation, affecting how WTO law is understood and applied. The
negotiation and interpretation of WTO law, in turn, affects countries’ policy space for social and
developmental initiatives as well as their ability to challenge foreign countries’ trade restrictions
affecting their exports. The scope of the WTO legal order entails not only formal disputes, which
are of great interest and generate reams of scholarship, but also the shadow effects of law on
claims that are settled and never known and on domestic regulatory policy initiatives that are
advanced, not considered, or are shelved.2
Participating in the construction and interpretation of WTO law, however, is not free, not
for governments, nor for private parties. Its interpretation has become highly complex and
evolving, with its jurisprudence exceeding 70,000 pages of panel and Appellate Body decisions
issued through mid-2012.3 Not all are in the position to participate in shaping the WTO legal
order and its effects.
For India, the negotiation and interpretation of WTO law affects multiple policy issues,
from the contours of intellectual property (IP) law, to the export of generic drugs, to the
1
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development of an automotive sector, to the regulation of labor and the environment, to
restrictions on imports and exports through antidumping law. All of these issues have been
directly or indirectly the subject of WTO disputes, and all of them involve disputes in which
India has been a party. Formal WTO disputes, however, only begin to reflect the implications of
WTO law.
This chapter examines the growing role of Indian lawyers in the transformation of Indian
trade policy through the development of trade-related legal capacity. By trade-related legal
capacity we mean, broadly, the ability of a country to use law to engage proactively in the
development and defense of international and domestic policy. Such capacity is critical for the
drafting and interpretation of international legal agreements, the adoption of domestic regulation
within those agreements’ constraints in order to defend policy space, the monitoring of foreign
commitments, and the development of legal arguments in formal international litigation and
informal dispute settlement. Through developing legal capacity, public and private actors work
together to open export opportunities abroad and defend domestic policy measures at home.
While others have written of the legalization of international trade through the increased role of
the WTO legal secretariat and the emergence of the WTO Appellate Body in international
dispute settlement,4 this chapter addresses the growing role of lawyers in the development of
trade policy at home in one of the world’s rising powers, India.
The chapter builds from years of field research in India and Geneva, involving semistructured interviews with over fifty Indian officials and stakeholders.5 The interviewees
included former Ambassadors, members of the bureaucracy, private lawyers, private trade
association and industry representatives, researchers in think tanks, academics, and news
reporters. We complemented these interviews with participant observation in Geneva and in New
Delhi, and reviewed our findings against primary and secondary documents.
I. Terrain of the Debate and Theoretical Context
Our arguments and findings resonate with and contribute to three interrelated literatures
and debates that implicate the role of lawyers in emerging economies. They are: the creation of
transnational legal orders, the rise of the new developmental state, and the building of legal
capacity to engage with and shape such transnational legal orders and their implications for the
developmental state.
First, this study documents the increasing role of transnational legal ordering and its
implications for law and lawyers in nation states.6 The study of transnational legal ordering
places the relationship between international, transnational, and domestic legal processes in
tension that gives rise to the potential institutionalization of legal norms, and in particular within
nation states. Transnational legal ordering involves both top-down and bottom-up processes that
operate recursively and dynamically, shaping the meaning of legal norms. This chapter addresses
how India has engaged lawyers to enhance its ability to participate and shape the WTO legal
order, and in the process also changed, in part, itself. It examines the reciprocal transformations
4
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entailed in the WTO legal order, about how a country transforms itself in order to engage with
the WTO and, in turn, shape it, giving rise to transnational legal ordering.
Second, our findings contribute to an emergent revisionist argument about the
developmental state across regions and issue areas.7 We find that the Indian state has not
withdrawn from global and transnational influences (per the developmental state model of the
1950s), but rather been transformed and enhanced. The WTO catalyzes the building of new state
capacity, including legal and regulatory capacity, even though its raison d' être is to free markets
and liberalize trade among nations. As Aseema Sinha writes, the “globalization of trade rules…
creates pressures to strengthen national state agencies and trade policy processes.”8 We find that
the WTO and WTO law have spurred the Indian developmental state to enhance its legal
capacity in relation to both international economic law and its implications for domestic law
reform.
Third, because of the implications of transnational legal ordering for the developmental
state, states invest in the building of legal capacity so as to engage in the shaping of global rules
and assess alternatives for their implementation in order to protect policy space.9 This study
contributes to our understanding of how developing countries build legal capacity so as to better
participate in the construction of the WTO legal order and its implications for the developmental
state. India is pressed to adapt to WTO legal norms, and at times uses them to facilitate policy
reforms. But it also seeks to shape and modify the understanding of the rules for its own ends. To
do so, it must build legal capacity, in particular through opening the state bureaucracy to engage
with the private sector and private lawyers.
II. India and the GATT Years: Little Role for Law and Lawyers
Before the creation of the WTO, India was a closed economy, built on a socialist model
of five-year plans, wary of international economic commitments in light of its colonial heritage,
erecting a centralized bureaucracy and administering what was known as the “License Raj.” The
Indian bureaucratic system was viewed as sclerotic in that decision making could be time- and
resource-consuming, slowing entrepreneurial endeavor, although it also demanded a certain
nimbleness for businesses to navigate.10 Firms were preoccupied with obtaining licenses to
import, and subsidies to export, as part of complicated government policies to manage Indian
balance of payments, for which they had little need for lawyers. The result was considerable rent
seeking by Indian businesses. Their primary market was domestic. They felt unable to compete
internationally. As the development economist I.M.D. Little wrote in a widely read text in the
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early 1980s, “developing countries never expected to be able to export manufacturers to the
developed countries.”11
Neither the government nor the private sector had much of a focus on international trade,
so that India paid little attention to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the
predecessor to the WTO, and made few legal commitments under it. At the time that the
Uruguay Round negotiations were in full swing in 1990-91, India’s maximum tariff rate was 355
percent and its simple average applied tariff rate was 125 percent. Only six percent of Indian
tariff lines were bound, meaning that India could raise tariff rates for ninety-four percent of its
tariff lines at any time. India complemented the tariff regime with different types of quantitative
restrictions. These restrictions took various complicated forms, such as those administered
through non-automatic licenses, through canalized agencies, through special import licenses, and
subject to different conditions. They were imposed on the grounds that India had to monitor
continually its unfavorable balance-of-payments situation.12
The administrative system for import restrictions required a bureaucracy, creating delays,
uncertainty, and opportunities for corruption. The bureaucracy was insular and non-transparent
and the private sector that engaged with it did so to obtain quota rents from the licensing
system.13 As an example of such non-transparency, a former Commerce official told us that the
first shredder provided to a service within the Indian Ministry of Commerce went to the trade
division handling the GATT.14 In such a closed, non-transparent system, law and business
lawyers had little role to play.
III. Catalysts of Building Indian Legal Capacity in Trade Law
The Indian development model changed in the 1990s. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989 and the socialist model discredited, Indian officials eyed with envy the rise of East Asian
economies with their export-oriented growth models. While East Asia grew, India in 1991 was
struck by a severe economic crisis from the Gulf War oil shock and India’s dependence on
petroleum imports. The government went to the International Monetary Fund for emergency
credits of US $ 2.3 billion dollars.15 As a condition to IMF financing (a conditionality, in the
IMF’s terms), the IMF called for reforms of the Indian system, including an opening to foreign
trade. Under duress, the Indian government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and its Finance
Minister Manmohan Singh responded. They later spun these reforms as homegrown, known as
the “1991 reforms,” which is how the reforms are conventionally discussed within India to this
day.16 Yet as a former high level member of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) confirmed
to us, “the IMF and international institutions helped to provide an excuse to do what otherwise
11
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was more difficult to do politically, as change was otherwise very difficult to obtain.”17 The
reforms had a significant impact, as India engaged with a globalizing economy. The proportion
of trade (imports and exports) to India’s GDP was 8% in 1970, but expanded six-fold to 46% by
2010.18
The United States (U.S.) and European Union (E.U.) dominated the Uruguay Round
negotiations, and India was pressed to respond to U.S. and E.U. initiatives. Although the Indian
government consulted with the private sector and civil society, civil society activists roundly
critiqued the government for insufficient consultations. The most controversial issues for civil
society activists were agriculture and patents, although much of the industrial sector was also
concerned about the implications of the agreements for their competitiveness.
The Uruguay Round negotiations and the resulting WTO agreements that became
effective on January 1, 1995 were broad in their coverage, encompassing nineteen distinct
multilateral agreements, affecting market access in manufacturing, agriculture and textiles,
intellectual property, services, and trade-related investment measures. Joining the WTO meant
that India had to implement these WTO commitments, opening its economy to competition, and,
in the process, providing new opportunities for business lawyers, directly and indirectly.
Under the WTO, India bound almost 65 percent of its tariff lines.19 It significantly
reduced import duties. In practice, India lowered its applied tariff rates much beyond its actual
WTO commitments to an average of around twelve percent by 2010.20 India also joined the new
Information Technology Agreement in 1996 that a subset of WTO members finalized at the
WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, which binds tariff rates at zero percent on information
technology products. India, in addition, made market access commitments regarding services for
the first time under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), involving thirty-three
services sectors. Pursuant to the transparency provisions of the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement), India also created new administrative enquiry points for all technical
regulation and sanitary and phytosanitary protection measures.
However, the Indian government and business did not engage in legal capacity building
immediately in response to the WTO’s creation. Rather, they responded to the WTO law-inaction, and in particular to politically sensitive complaints brought against India by the U.S..
What spurred India’s development of legal capacity, as in the case of Brazil and China, was
being placed on the defensive.21 The U.S. and E.U. brought a series of critical cases against India
in the WTO’s first years that pressed the Indian bureaucracy to develop new partnerships with
the private sector and private lawyers. The key disputes were India-Patents involving a U.S. and
E.U. challenge to India’s implementation of the TRIPS agreement;22 India-QR involving a U.S.
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challenge against India’s use of quantitative restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds;23 and
India-Autos involving a U.S. challenge of Indian measures to favor the development of a
domestic auto sector.24 The U.S. itself worked through public-private partnerships involving
government and private U.S. lawyers,25 a model that India would soon take into account.
In India-Patents, the U.S. and E.U. challenged India’s implementation of its commitment
under the TRIPS Agreement to create a transitional “mail-box system” where patent applications
could be filed to establish priority and obtain exclusive marketing rights on a transitional basis
until India provided patent protection for pharmaceuticals and chemical products used in
agriculture, such as fertilizers and pesticides. In defense, India contended that it had fulfilled its
commitments through administrative instructions, but it was unsuccessful before the panel and
Appellate Body. Within India, the case was called a “shot over the bow of a Hobbesian essence
of sovereignty.”26 The case nonetheless triggered significant legal analysis regarding how India
could ultimately comply with the TRIPS Agreement in a way that would make use of the
flexibilities provided in the agreement in light of India’s development and social policy
objectives.27
The most broad-reaching case affecting Indian industry and agriculture was the India-QR
decision that implicated the reform of India’s import licensing regime. India had experienced a
major balance-of-payments crisis in 1990-1991 and it had to go to the IMF to receive U.S.$ 2.3
billion dollars in credit. As a condition to the credit, India agreed to a series of reforms, including
the removal of quantitative restrictions and import licensing on most goods.28 India nonetheless
maintained import licensing and quantitative restrictions on consumer goods that accounted for
2,714 tariff lines, nearly 30 percent of its total number. In India-QR, the United States challenged
India’s invocation of quantitative restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds for these
remaining tariff lines. The case was a “wake up” call for India given its systemic importance for
India’s import controls. India had wished to keep the measures in effect until at least 2006, and
invoked its status as a developing country in defense. But India did not prevail. Rather, an IMF
representative reported that India no longer faced a balance-of-payments crisis, and the panel and
Appellate Body cited the IMF report as critical support of their decision against India.
The case exhibited the role of judicialization of WTO dispute settlement in comparison
with that under the GATT. Under the GATT, disputes over balance of payments had been
addressed politically within the GATT committee system.29 India contended that preexisting
23
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eds., 2002).
27
Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009); K M Gopakumar, Product Patents and Access to Medicine
in India: A Critical Review of the Implementation of the TRIPS Regime, 3THE LAW & DEVELOPMENT
REVIEW. 326, 338 (2010) (Indian Patents Act has limited the scope of patentability by defining patentability
criteria on novelty, inventive step and industrial applications, as well as by excluding certain types of inventions).
28
ARVIND PANAGARIYA, INDIA: THE EMREGING GIANT (2006), p106.
29
Richard Eglin, “Surveillance of Balance-of-Payments Measures in the GATT.” The World Economy 10: 1-26
(1987).
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practice under GATT precluded the dispute settlement panel from hearing the case, but it again
failed in this defense.
The WTO decision spurred fears in India that foreign products would flood the Indian
market, and, in particular, marine and dairy products, confectionary items, and fruits and
vegetables.30 The Commerce Ministry promised to establish a “war room” to keep a vigil on
some 300 sensitive products, and it constantly assured stakeholders that it had put adequate
monitoring mechanisms in place.31 The government appointed a Committee headed by the
Commerce Secretary and the Secretaries of Agriculture and of Small-Scale Industries to identify
any safeguards required and to forewarn industries and trade bodies if any action was needed.
Shortly later, the United States challenged India’s policy to support the development of a
national auto sector in India-Autos, which involved India’s use of local content, foreign
exchange, and trade balancing requirements as conditions for imports and investment in the auto
sector. The India-Autos dispute was in part a “mopping up” operation to eliminate the remaining
vestiges of the import-licensing regime that India was required to modify in the India-QR
decision.32 In addition, however, the Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) that the
government required from auto companies included commitments both to meet local content
requirements in their manufacturing operations and to ensure that the value of their exports
balanced the value of their imports. India lost this case as well, but, in practice, was able to use
the dispute settlement system to continue its requirements for a number of years to help develop
local manufacturing know-how and enhance competitiveness.33 Government officials contend
that the policy was successful, as India now exports autos to the Middle East, South Asia and
Central Asia, creating a new hub in competition with Thailand and Indonesia in the region.34
In each case, India had to defend its system in a losing case, but, in the process, learned
the importance of developing legal capacity, including to adapt its domestic measures to protect
development objectives. The Indian media covered these politically sensitive cases against India
in the WTO’s early days, raising awareness about the implications of the WTO dispute
settlement system for India. As Atul Kaushik, the lawyer in the government who handled WTO
dispute settlement in Geneva from 2003-2006, states, “these disputes were of high visibility for
India. The government felt it needed to build capacity regarding WTO law.”35
With the launch of the Doha Round in 2001, the government and business realized that
they needed to invest more resources in trade law-related capacity. As a representative of the
Indian chamber of commerce FICCI states, FICCI realized that it was “imperative” that business
become more involved “because of our sense of failure to do so in the Uruguay Round.”36
Although the Doha Round collapsed, India engaged in a growing number of bilateral and
plurilateral trade negotiations for which private sector collaboration was needed, and continued
to engage in periodic multilateral trade negotiation initiatives. By late 2006, advocates of a “new
30

Sukumar Muralidharan, Opening the floodgates, Frontline Vol. 18 (April 2001).
Shaffer Interview #11, in New Delhi (Jan 11, 2012). The government set up an inter-ministerial monitoring body
consisting of the Secretaries for Commerce, Revenue, Agriculture, Small Scale Industries, Animal Husbandry, and
the Director-General of Foreign Trade to monitor surges on imports of products where QRs were eliminated, and
potentially take action under India’s new import relief laws.
32
Kyle Bagwell and Alan Sykes, India- Measures Affecting Automotive Sector, American Law Institute, 2004.
33
Shaffer interview #24, Jan. 18, 2010.
34
Shaffer interview #24, Jan. 18, 2010.
35
Shaffer interview, Atul Kaushik, July 9, 2010.
36
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31

7

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2390673

India” saw the country as part of a global shift of economic power away from the U.S. and E.U.
and toward larger developing countries, namely the BRICs. Yet to be a global leader, India
needed to continue to enhance its legal capacity in the public and private sectors, giving rise to
public-private partnerships. While economists traditionally have been most important for Indian
policymaking analysis within and outside of the government, and they continue to be so today,
the bureaucratic establishment and economists were pressed to gradually recognize the
importance of law and lawyering.37 Since legal capacity was not built into the traditional Indian
government service, new methods were needed that could work with India’s bureaucratic
context.
IV. Reforming the State and the Creation of Public-Private Partnerships for Trade
Law and Policy
India responded to the challenges of the WTO by significantly investing in greater
expertise in the Indian bureaucracy that, in turn, became an interlocutor with the private sector
and private legal counsel. The government reformed the state, investing in state capacity within
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) as a node of trade law and policy, opening the
state bureaucracy to build and tap into legal capacity in the private sector, and creating a
government think tank, the Centre for WTO Studies to engage in policy relevant research and act
as a liaison between the Ministry of Commerce, the private sector, and private lawyers and
consultants.
The government designated MoCI as the nodal ministry for WTO negotiations and policy
and the ministry grew in prominence within the Indian bureaucracy.38 Within MoCI, the
government created three new specialized agencies to handle matters implicated by WTO law: a
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) that manages, among other matters,
intellectual property rights administration, a new Tariff Commission, and a reorganized
Directorate General of Antidumping and Allied Duties (DGAD). In 1996, K.M. Chandrasekhar
became Joint Secretary at the Department of Commerce and reconstituted the Trade Policy
Division to enhance government competence on trade matters and support the India mission to
the WTO in Geneva.39 The ministry increased staff strength from nine to forty officials within a
few years.40 The status of trade positions, moreover, increased within the Indian bureaucracy, so
that officials increasingly sought them. This trend complementarily increased the qualitative
capacity of Commerce ministry officials in trade law and policy.41
The government concurrently more than doubled the size of its mission in Geneva for
WTO matters and enhanced coordination between the Geneva mission and the Commerce
Ministry in New Delhi. In 1995 when the WTO started, the Indian mission in Geneva had one
ambassador and three officers. By 2010, the mission had six to eight officers, including one
dispute settlement specialist.42 As a former Ambassador of India to the WTO noted, “in the old
37

Shaffer interview # 41, Jan. 2010 (an Indian lawyer who worked with economists in think tanks).
Sinha, Global Linkages, supra note..,
39
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38

8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2390673

days, the Geneva mission received no meaningful inputs from the capital,” a situation unlike
today.43
Despite the relative growth in the capacity of trade officials in the Commerce Ministry in
Delhi and Geneva, the government still faced challenges given the scope of WTO issues. It
realized that it needed to spur the development of complementary private sector capacity
building, and to open itself to greater private sector and civil society input. The government
obtained critical external support for capacity building within India through a capacity building
project led by UNCTAD and supported by India’s Commerce Ministry and Britain’s Department
for International Development (DFID), named “Strategies and Preparedness for Trade and
Globalisation in India” (UNCTAD Capacity Building Project). The UNCTAD Capacity Building
Project lasted eight years, from January 2003 to December 2010, and was first led by Veena Jha,
an Indian trade economist whose husband, Harsha Singh was one of the four Deputy Director
Generals at the WTO.44 Aiming to strengthen human and institutional capacity for responding to
trade issues, the project organized a series of broad-based and sector-specific stakeholder
consultations in India. Through developing a new network of stakeholders, the UNCTAD
Capacity Building Project was able to mobilize farmers, fishermen, and small producers to
articulate their interests and concerns to inform the government’s approach to WTO and new free
trade agreement (FTA) negotiations for the first time. The aim was both to facilitate their
providing input to the government, and to enable them to develop better strategies to adapt to
economic globalization processes. The UNCTAD project also helped to spur MoCI to work with
various state governments to establish WTO cells in order to enhance awareness of the WTO and
provide feedback to MoCI from state governments, which govern populations larger than most
WTO members.45
Given the difficulty of changing the bureaucracy from within, the Ministry decided to
outsource research and the building of public-private collaboration to government-sponsored
think tanks, and, in particular, the Centre for WTO Studies (which directly reports to MoCI), and
private lawyers that contract with MoCI or the Centre. MoCI created the Centre for WTO
Studies in 1999.46 The last head of the UNCTAD project, Abhijit Das, son of B L Das, former
Indian ambassador to the GATT, became the head of the Centre for WTO Studies, which
continues the networking initiatives begun in the UNCTAD Capacity Building Project. Das
formerly worked in the division of the Commerce Ministry handling WTO disputes and so
understood the need for home-grown legal capacity in light of the implications of WTO law.
The mission of the Centre for WTO Studies is three-fold: (1) to conduct research for
MoCI; (2) to act as a liaison between MoCI and industry and civil society; and (3) to assist in
capacity building and information diffusion through organizing workshops and publishing
newsletters and reports.47 As of December 2012, the Centre had eight members, one of whom is
43

Shaffer interview #1, India (Jan 16, 2012).
Shaffer interview with Abhijit Das, January 21, 2010 when he worked in the UNCTAD project. Nedumpara, one
of the co-authors of this chapter, also worked in the project.
45
WTO cells were established at the state level in Kerala, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil
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Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Suprita Jayaram, Functioning of WTO Cells in India: A Critique,
CUTS International (2006), available at http://www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/BP06-DI-9.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
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47
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a lawyer. The Ministry of Commerce refers questions to the Centre relating to international trade
negotiations, domestic policy that may be affected by international trade law, and potential
claims against trading partners’ measures that affect Indian exports. The Centre then outsources
some of this work to private contractors, such as private lawyers and academics. One of the
authors of this study, James Nedumpara, has served as a consultant.
Over time, the government has felt more freedom to work with the private sector,
including skilled private Indian lawyers regarding WTO legal issues, whether directly or through
the Centre, instead of trying to do everything in-house. As a result, today “there is a small
industry of [legal] consultants growing around the Department of Commerce that helps to fill the
government’s needs.”48 As Abhijit Das, Head of the Centre for WTO Studies, states, trade policy
making became both much more “participatory” and was “based on stronger empirical
foundations.”49 Today, for all major WTO dispute settlement rulings, Commerce tries to
organize a session where a private consultant will make a presentation to the Department of
Commerce and other ministries.50 For example, following the China-Raw Materials case, the
Commerce Ministry identified twenty affected Indian ministries and invited all of them to hear a
presentation of the findings to “raise awareness.”51
The Centre’s initiatives exemplify how the WTO has helped to catalyze major changes in
government relations with affected stakeholders and with private lawyers, giving rise to a trade
law variant of public-private partnerships. The Indian system remains rather top-down where the
private sector plays a much more limited role than in comparison with the U.S.. Nonetheless, the
change constitutes a major one in India, one that appears to be here to stay. As Professor Bipin
Kumar of the National Law University Jodhpur told us, “the new mantra in India is publicprivate partnerships. The old mentality regarding government is changing.”52
V. The Field of Private Indian Trade Lawyers and their Role
Over the last decade, a small group of private Indian lawyers have developed trade law
expertise and served the government on a variety of trade law matters. These lawyers perform
three types of work. They advise the government on its policies for purposes of its negotiating
positions (negotiating work). They provide input on the drafting of legislation and regulation and
the consideration of policy in light of WTO law (internal policy work). They assist the
government in evaluating WTO cases for and against it (litigation work). And they represent the
private sector in import relief cases, such as antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards
cases (covered separately by Mark Wu in this volume).
The number of lawyers working on trade law matters is rather small in light of the
primarily intergovernmental nature of the WTO legal system. These highly skilled lawyers have
a particular passion for international trade law. They largely work within boutique firms,
although such firms can have over one hundred attorneys overall. The largest elite law firms
generally have not developed a major international trade law practice, though a partner in Luthra
& Luthra (Moushami Joshi) works on trade matters as part of her portfolio, and the founder of
Clarus Law Associates (R.V. Anuradha), a small boutique firm, was formerly a partner at India’s
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largest law firm, Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A Shroff & Co.. A list of the law firms
working on international trade law matters, noting the type of law firm (using the categorization
set forth in chapter 1 of this volume) and the type of trade law work, is listed in Annex 1.
The private lawyers working in India on trade issues often received some graduate legal
education in the U.S. or Europe. The leading Indian lawyer experienced in WTO cases, Krishnan
Venugopal, went to Harvard Law School where he received an LLM and started an SJD, and
practiced with the U.S. law firm, Paul Weiss. Suhail Nathani, who started the boutique firm
Economic Law Practice (ELP) based in Mumbai and Delhi, received a BA from Cambridge and
an LLM from Duke Law School. Samir Gandhi, who was earlier with ELP went to the London
School of Economics for his LLM. R.V. Anuradha who founded Clarus Law Associates received
a masters at SOAS at the University of London and was a global law scholar at NYU Law
School. Moushami Joshi, a partner at Luthra & Luthra, received her LLM from George
Washington University Law School. As Joshi says regarding her experience in the U.S., “I had
an interest in international trade and it just got strengthened when I was in DC. And DC being an
international place, you get to attend so many conferences; you are constantly going to all these
meetings that think tanks have, which was great because I think it just opened up my mind to this
whole new world of law and legal practice.”53
The government facilitated the rise of talented, elite lawyers through its investment in the
development of highly selective national law schools. Most directly regarding trade law, in 1996,
just after the WTO’s creation, the government funded a WTO Chair at the leading Indian law
school, the National Law School of India University (NLSIU) in Bangalore. The government’s
funding of a specific chair in trade law signaled the government’s view of the growing
importance of the subject, and the hope that the government would indirectly benefit from new
talent among young legal professionals.54 As K.M. Chandresekhar, who was instrumental in the
chair’s creation when he was Joint Secretary in the Trade Policy Division, informed us, “the idea
was to get young lawyers who can follow and provide expertise on WTO matters. The idea was
to create new structures within the Indian context.”55
Students at these elite law schools have taken a number of independent initiatives that
further spurred knowledge building in international trade law in India. For example, NLSIU
started one of the first student edited Journals on international trade law, The Indian Journal of
International Economic Law. The National Law University in Jodhpur followed by creating a
specialization in International Trade and Investment Law and publishing a journal founded by a
student in 2009 entitled Trade, Law and Development. A young generation of academics at
Jindal Global Law School organized a concentration on international trade law and trade remedy
law for LL.M students, and run a research center on international trade and economic law
(CITEL) where students from leading law schools in India and abroad are offered a paid
internship under the Global Research Internship Program (GRIP).
A number of Indian international trade lawyers came out of the national law schools,
such as R.V. Anuradha who graduated from Bangalore National Law School in 1995 and Samir
Gandhi and Moushami Joshi who respectively graduated from there in 1998 and 2001. As Joshi
told us, she had three graduates from the national law schools working for her on trade law
53
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matters in 2012.56 Similarly, within the Centre for WTO Studies, Shailaja Singh joined as a legal
consultant following receiving a degree from the West Bengal National University of Juridical
Sciences, Kolkata, followed by an LLM at Cambridge University.57
Building from an earlier Brazilian model,58 MoCI has also created an internship program
for law students, which is overseen by the India Institute of Foreign Trade.59 In parallel, other
Indian public and private institutions have run internship programs for students in trade law as
well, including the Centre for WTO studies, CUTS International, and law firms such as Luthra &
Luthra Law Offices, APJ-SLG Law Offices, Dua Associates, Lakshmikumran & Sridharan,
Economic Law Practice, Seth Dua & Associates, Clarus Law Associates, and Amarchand &
Mangaldas & Suresh A Shroff & Co.. Placement in these internships is highly competitive, and
law graduates have opted for them even when they have had an opportunity to work full-time in
the more lucrative corporate law sector. These students have great interest in international trade
law.
1. Trade Negotiations Support
With the launch of the Doha negotiating round in 2001, India adapted in order to play a
more engaged role in the WTO system. To do so, the government created new linkages with
stakeholders and consulted with them more regularly and transparently. While the trade division
was previously known for being remote and non-transparent, now the government began to more
proactively and regularly share analysis and documents with the private sector and seek legal
opinions from Indian law firms. The government did so because of a sense that it would
embarrass itself if the administration did not become more proactive and effective in tapping into
and making use of the information and expertise of the private sector and a new generation of
professionals engaged with global issues.60
Perhaps most significantly, India worked with Brazil to respond at the 2003 Cancun
Ministerial meeting to a Joint E.U.-U.S. proposal on agriculture that failed to reflect the interests
of Brazil and India. The Brazilian and Indian governments worked with think tanks in their
respective countries to develop new modalities for WTO agricultural negotiations. Many
consider this proactive developing country stance on negotiating modalities to be a “defining
moment of change for the WTO” and its negotiating system.61 It was the first time that emerging
economies had come together to submit an integrated, detailed proposal on modalities that
reflected their concerns. The think tanks’ analyses provided the analytic heft for the G-20 in the
Doha Round agricultural negotiations.
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In order to enhance its capacity, the Indian trade policymaking process became more
inclusive.62 As one senior Indian official observed, the new Trade Policy Division decided to
“open its doors” to the private sector and civil society during the Doha Round of negotiations.63
The government increasingly invited industry and civil society representatives for consultations.
Industry associations such as the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(FICCI) and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) responded. FICCI established a new
WTO Division and CII a new Trade Policy Section. They, in turn, conducted their own
stakeholder consultations with their members.64 Other industry organizations such as
ASSOCHAM and PHD Chamber did as well, conducting industry-wide consultations on trade
negotiation matters before and after key events such as Ministerial conferences and free trade
agreement negotiations. The government shared the cost of these industry consultations and
provided technical support,65 recognizing its ultimate dependence on private sector support.66
Although the WTO Doha Round of negotiations stalled since 2008,67 trade negotiations
remained active in bilateral and regional forums, and continued in a less ambitious manner
within the WTO itself. Bilateral and regional trade negotiations give rise to competition among
countries to gain market access. These competitive processes have spurred India to enter a slew
of bilateral and regional trade negotiations and agreements. India has signed trade agreements
with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, ASEAN (separately from its members),
Sri Lanka, Chile, Afghanistan, Mercosur, South African Customs Union (SACU), Gulf
Cooperation Council, and an Agreement on South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) involving
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.68 India has also launched
negotiations for free trade agreements with the E.U., EFTA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Indonesia, Egypt, Israel, and a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership with the
countries of Asia. Developments in these bilateral and regional forums potentially could trigger
momentum for broader multilateral negotiations.
The government consults a group of trade lawyers regarding the legal texts being
negotiated in these trade agreements, as well as other international law agreements implicated by
trade law. The government hires private Indian attorneys for specialized assistance in specific
legal areas, such as intellectual property, services, standards, import relief, and government
procurement. For example, the government hired the Strategic Law Group (now part of the APJSLG Law Offices) to help in the preparation of India’s proposal for a lesser duty rule under the
Rules Negotiations in the Doha Round.69 For FTA negotiations, firms such as Economic Laws
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Practice and Lakshmikumaran and Sridharan have also provided the government with advice.70
At times, the lawyers work with economists who address the economic implications of particular
negotiating positions and modalities, whether for trade in goods or trade in services.71 At times,
other government departments have engaged these attorneys for international law-related work
that may be indirectly implicated by WTO law, such as the Ministry of Environment and Forests
regarding climate change.
Indian business also increasingly recognized the implications of WTO trade negotiations.
As Kaushik states, as India opened up its economy to international trade, “there was recognition
of industries that they need to get to a higher competitive level vis-à-vis their competitors. Those
industries recognized the need for internal capacities to deal with international trade matters.”72
The process started with the creation of WTO cells within Indian trade associations and large
companies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These cells were created across sectors, from auto
components to financial services to textiles. They handle different aspects of trade law and
policy, including market access issues in trade negotiations, as well as (more broadly) export and
import issues, export control matters, trade remedy matters such as antidumping, countervailing
duty and safeguard investigations, technical regulations and standards and other regulatory
matters. For example, Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO), the largest Indian steel maker,
engaged a senior consultant to advise the company and the consortium of Indian steel companies
in the OECD steel subsidies negotiations.
2. WTO Implementation and Policy Space
The WTO system has significant implications for national law and policy. As illustration,
WTO rules and dispute settlement affected the substance and timing of India’s dismantling of its
license raj and system of quantitative restrictions, India’s adoption and implementation of a new
patent law, and the rise of Indian import relief laws and administrative actions. Yet WTO law
and its implementation are also subject to legal interpretation, potentially creating work for
lawyers.
The government and business have engaged private lawyers to assess government policy
options in light of existing trade law. The Commerce Department receives a large number of
questions from other Indian departments on WTO compatibility of legislation and regulation and
it at times outsources such questions to private consultants. Regarding Indian legislation
generally, the Joint Secretary in MoCI informed us that it “gets references about every single
day” regarding the WTO implications for proposed legislation, regulation or policy.73
As other government departments become aware of the implications of WTO agreements,
they also have contacted private attorneys for consultations. WTO law affects industrial policy
choices, such as the use of subsidies and domestic content requirements, and thus implicates
many Indian ministries. For example, the powerful Indian planning commission has contacted
private attorneys regarding choices over building power infrastructure, including options for
increasing or reducing tariffs and applying local content requirements to build domestic
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manufacturing capacity.74 In the past, we were told, the Planning Commission would never have
consulted outside lawyers, much less regarding international trade law, so this development is a
significant one in indicating the broader implications of WTO law for Indian law and policy. The
government likewise engaged consultations from private law firms regarding the implications of
the GATT and WTO agreements on India’s emerging renewable energy policies, including
consideration of renewable energy requirements for utilities.75 These government departments
have also worked with private attorneys who initially worked with the Department of Commerce
on trade law matters, and who now also provide consultations regarding Indian legislation in
relation to other international law.76 The WTO can be seen as a catalyst, and part of a broader
trend, for the government becoming aware of the need to integrate outside legal counsel in
understanding the international law implications of Indian legislative and administrative policy
initiatives.
The WTO cells in private companies and trade associations, addressed above, also
provide analysis of trade policy initiatives and regulatory issues. Large Indian companies, more
generally, have hired in-house lawyers to reduce the dependence on law firms, including for
work that may require knowledge of WTO law. For example, a Commerce official told us he saw
that a “textile fashion designer recruited three lawyers with terms of reference regarding how
much WTO law they know.”77 Small and medium sized Indian companies (SMEs), in parallel,
have used the services of specialists within industry and trade associations, such as Texprocil,
Confederation of India’s Textile Industry (CITI),78 Automotive Component Manufacturers
Association of India (ACMA),79 Federation of Indian Export Organization (FIEO),80 Society of
Indian Manufactures (SIAM),81 Automobile Components Manufacturers Association of India
(ACMA), Association of Synthetic Fiber Industry (ASFI) and the National Association of
Software & Services (NASSCOM).82
WTO law grants countries some flexibility in interpreting its provisions so that India had
some leeway in determining how to revise its laws and adapt its institutions. India, for example,
radically revised its patent law, expanding protection to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
products pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement. Yet the government did so in an innovative manner
after a long internal study and consultations with stakeholders. It created new definitions of what
a patent must show in terms of novelty and an inventive step, thus narrowing the scope of patent
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claims.83 In parallel, India made it considerably easier to challenge patents than under U.S. and
E.U. models by including both pre- and post-grant challenges, and permitting these challenges to
occur before an administrative body that is more efficient in processing them than a court.84
The WTO has created work for lawyers beyond traditional trade law work, as
exemplified by intellectual property law. As the World Intellectual Property Organization (2013)
reports, “[f]rom 1997 to 2011, patent filings increased … in India by 605 percent.” Major
litigation over intellectual property rights is taking place in India in the shadow of the TRIPS
Agreement, such as Novartis v. Union of India in 2007, Novartis Ag v. Union of India in 2013,
and Bayer v. Union of India in 2010.85 Norms in India have shifted regarding patents. As a
former Indian Ambassador to the WTO quipped to us, “now one speaks of patent or perish;
whereas before the mantra was no patents or perish.”86 These developments reflect the important,
but indirect, ways in which the WTO has affected law and lawyering in India in subject-specific
areas.
3. WTO Dispute Settlement
A small group of Indian lawyers in the private sector have become increasingly important
for providing counsel to India on potential and actual WTO trade disputes. The GATT dispute
settlement system was slow and weak compared to the WTO’s, and India participated little. In
GATT’s roughly fifty-year history, India was a party in three minor cases, of which only one
resulted in a formal GATT report.87
With the commitments that India and other countries made in the Uruguay Round, and
with the rise of the WTO’s legalized and judicialized dispute settlement system, this situation
changed. India has become one of the leading users of the WTO dispute settlement system, along
with Brazil and China among non-OECD countries. Through October 2013, India was a
complainant in 21 disputes and a respondent in 22 disputes.88 It was a third party in 91 additional
ones. A complete list of disputes where India has been involved as a complainant or respondent
is provided in Annexes 2 and 3, together with the lawyers who assisted the government in these
disputes.
India has brought systemically important claims before the WTO system, in addition to
those in which it has been a respondent. The US-Shrimp dispute is arguably the most referenced
WTO case regarding the interpretation of the GATT exception clause, Article XX, addressing
the interaction of trade rules with environmental protection measures. The EC-GSP case is
central for understanding legal requirements under the General Systems of Preferences. The
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Turkey-Textiles case establishes the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement body in assessing
the legality of regional trade agreements under GATT Article XXIV. The EC-Bed Linen case
was the first to challenge the practice of zeroing used by the E.U. and U.S., which creates biased
calculations of dumping margins against imports.89 And in the early case, US-Shirt and Blouses,
the Appellate Body clarified the burden of proof in WTO cases.90 To bring cases, however, is not
enough, given the systemic implications of these decisions. A country’s aim is not only to win a
case, but also to shape the understanding of WTO law in line with its broader economic policy
objectives.
After the India-Patents case, the government initially outsourced work to foreign
lawyers, but then increasingly worked with a cadre of Indian lawyers, sometimes working with
or sometimes without foreign ones. The government first turned to Frieder Roessler, the former
head of the GATT legal secretariat, initially in his private capacity, and then as the first
Executive Director of a new Advisory Center on WTO Law (ACWL) in Geneva in 2002. India
quickly became the ACWL’s most active user. Roessler worked for India in the India-QR and
India-Auto disputes in his individual capacity, and in the EU-GSP and the US-Rules of Origin
disputes as part of ACWL. The government also periodically works with foreign lawyers in
cases involving foreign application of import relief laws against Indian imports, such as with the
Brussels based law firm Vermulst Waer & Verhaeghe (VWV) in the EC-Bed Linen dispute which
had represented the country in the underlying antidumping case in Brussels.
In parallel, however, the government began to work with an Indian attorney, Krishnan
Venugopal, on WTO cases, starting with the India-Patents case when Venugopal was attached to
the Attorney General’s office of India (from 1996-1998). Venugopal would continue to work
with the government in future disputes on an ad hoc basis as he established an important
Supreme Court practice, following the path of his father, one of India’s most renowned lawyers
before the Indian Supreme Court. Venugopal worked on the India-Patents, India-QR, IndiaAutos, EC-GSP,, and US-Customs Bond Directive cases, either alone or jointly with other
lawyers.91 The U.S.-Customs Bond case was the first in which Venugopal worked with the
government where it was not also assisted by Roessler and the ACWL. This move reflected the
government’s growing confidence in being able to work with Venugopal, individually, and with
Indian attorneys more generally.92
As a new generation of WTO-specialized legal talent developed in India, the government
worked with a broader cadre of Indian law firms. The government hired Economics Laws
Practice (ELP) in the India-Additional Duties case, in which the Indian attorneys Suhail Nathani
and Samir Gandhi worked,93 Luthra & Luthra Law Offices in the India-Agricultural products
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case,94 Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan in the US-Steel Plate case,95 and Clarus Law Associates, a
Delhi-based boutique firm, in the India-Solar Cells case.96 To explore a potential claim, the
Department of Commerce also engaged Clarus Law Associates to examine the legal issues
behind a WTO challenge against restrictive U.S. Visa requirements under the Southwest Border
Protection Act and the James Zadroga Act.97 In addition, Indian law firms increasingly provide
legal analysis and drafting support for India’s third party submissions in WTO cases.98 Third
party submissions are important because decisions in WTO cases involving other countries can
have systemic implications for the understanding and future application of WTO law, and India
has increasingly asserted third party rights in WTO cases.
The Indian government’s work with the affected private sector in US-Custom Bond
Directive provides an example of a successful Indian public-private partnership.99 In this case,
India successfully challenged an enhanced bond requirement applied by the U.S. in an
antidumping proceeding involving frozen warm water shrimp from India and other developing
countries. Indian seafood exporters saw their exports decline by almost one-third following the
imposition of U.S. antidumping duties in 2004. The government worked with the private sector,
which is generally small and unorganized, through the government’s Marine Products Exporters
Development Authority (MPEDA) and the Seafood Exporters Association of India (SEAI).
These two public agencies work to enhance foreign market access for Indian seafood products,
including in antidumping proceedings abroad. MPEDA and SEAI covered most of the legal fees
and expenses in the case.100 SEAI contributed more than 50% of the total costs from its internal
resources and the rest from member contributions as a function of the value of their respective
exports.101 Seafood exporters are on MPEDA’s Management Board, which facilitated the costsharing agreement.
India and its seafood exporters paid a high price (from an Indian perspective) in the
underlying U.S. antidumping investigations, spending nearly U.S. $12 million (around INR 65
crores) from 2003-2010.102 Challenging the measure at the WTO, in contrast, was much less
costly, demonstrating the potential benefit of building WTO-related legal capacity. The Indian
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shrimp exporters also successfully pushed the government to join a group of countries that
successfully challenged the U.S. Byrd Amendment (known in the WTO as the US-Offset Act)
under which the U.S. distributed the revenue obtained from U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duty proceedings to the petitioning U.S. domestic industry, thereby subsidizing it.
India also worked closely with the private sector in successfully settling its WTO claim
against the E.U. in the EC-Drug Seizure case.103 India challenged the seizure of Indian generic
drugs at various airports in Europe (and, in particular, the Netherlands) when the planes were
being refueled before taking the generics to other developing countries, such as Brazil. A number
of Indian industry associations, including Pharmaxil and FICCI, worked with the government to
assess the facts, legal claims, and negotiating strategies before the government commenced
consultations with the E.U.. The government worked with Venugopal, U.S. law professor
Frederick Abbott, and Moushami Joshi at Luthra & Lutrha who provided background support, to
negotiate a favorable settlement with the E.U..104
4. Import Relief Work.
Following the WTO’s creation, India created and applied import relief laws, and it soon
initiated more antidumping investigations than any other WTO member. India updated trade
remedy legislation that would require greater legal analysis both within government and the
private sector.105 It reorganized the Indian bureaucracy for import controls, and reformed the
Directorate-General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) within an expanded Trade Policy Division (TPD)
in the Department of Commerce. Law gradually and increasingly encroached on administrative
discretion.
In the private bar, a new import relief specialized practice developed. Many of the
leading lawyers came from government service, moving to private practice because it was much
more lucrative. For example, the three largest practitioners in the antidumping field, V.
Lakshmikumaran, Sharad Bhanasali, and A.K. Gupta all came from government services. This
vibrant legal practice catalyzed by the WTO’s creation and India’s commitments under the WTO
agreements is described in Mark Wu’s chapter in this volume, and we do not address it further
here.
VI. The Limits of International Trade Law Work
Because of the government’s constraints on fees, a WTO law practice is far from
lucrative for Indian lawyers. Many large Indian firms thus do not engage in WTO law work.
Others, such as Luthra & Luthra Law Offices, Economic Laws Practice, and Lakshmikumaran &
Sridharan, complement their WTO work with a tax, customs, competition, and antidumping law
practice. The bulk of trade law practice for most Indian law firms is under India’s import relief
laws, and, in particular, antidumping work. For example, TPM Consulting, a firm started by AK
Gupta, claims to have handled at least 200 antidumping investigations in the last ten years.106 At
times, domestic antidumping work can lead to WTO work as well, as antidumping measures and
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105
See The Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment, and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles
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other trade remedies have constituted around one-third of WTO dispute settlement cases.107
Some firms aim, in particular, to build a competition law practice, which somewhat overlaps
with antidumping law-type analysis, such as regarding the definition of an industry, its injury
from unfair competition, and causation. They include such familiar names in Indian trade law as
Krishnan Venugopal, Suhail Nathani, Samir Gandhi, R.V.Anuradha, Moushami Joshi, Sharad
Bhansali, S.Seetharaman, and Atul Dua. Those firms that engage in WTO-related legal work
often do so for the reputational benefits of representing the country in international dispute
settlement, which, in turn, can support their domestic practice.
These practices would be helped if Indian corporations and trade associations were to
hire them more frequently for WTO-related work. Although the government has sought to work
more closely with the business sector, the government has generally had to cover all of the costs
for legal analysis and litigation, unlike in other countries such as Brazil. This reliance on
government funds reflects, in part, an attitude in the Indian private sector that international trade
relations are the government’s responsibility. Many in the government, as well as private
lawyers, hope that this attitude will change.
IV. Conclusion
The WTO trading system is a point of entry for understanding law and lawyers in India in
the broader global context. This chapter examined India’s reciprocal relationship with the global
trading system. On the one hand, it assessed India’s efforts to build legal capacity for trade
negotiations, dispute settlement, and domestic policy in order to defend its interests and shape
the international trade legal order. India aims to influence the rules through negotiation and
litigation, and thereby both gain market access abroad for its exports and preserve policy space
domestically for its policies. On the other hand, the chapter showed the impact of the
international trade law system on domestic institutions in India in light of India’s wish to engage
it, and the opportunities and constraints the system provides for public and private actors who
promote internal reform, defend policy space, and challenge market barriers abroad.
The WTO privileges the value of legal expertise to a much greater extent in trade and
regulatory policy than before. It catalyzed the development of new legal capacity within the
Indian state and pressed the Indian bureaucracy to become more transparent and open to greater
input from the private sector and civil society. It spurred the government to outsource work to
private Indian law firms to address WTO claims, potential claims, negotiating positions, the
implementation of WTO requirements, and the consideration of domestic policy initiatives in
light of them. Indirectly, but critical for the GLEE project represented in this volume, WTO law
and processes facilitate and embed market opening to trade and investment that, in turn, bolsters
a market for business lawyers.
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Annex 1: Indian law firms engaged on trade matters
Among the large law firms in India, only Luthra & Luthra has been involved in WTO dispute
settlement. Firms such as Amarchand Mangaldas and J. Sagar Associates handle trade remedy
work (mainly antidumping), but they have never been engaged by the government for WTO
dispute settlement. We do not list firms engaged in legal practices implicated by WTO law, such
as intellectual property law.
WTO Litigation/consultation
Law Firm (WTO dispute
settlement)
Luthra & Luthra
Economic Laws Practice
Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan
Clarus Law Associates
Law Offices of Krishnan
Venugopal

Number of Lawyers

Typology

>300 lawyers
>150 lawyers
~150 lawyers
~10 lawyers
Senior Advocate, Supreme
Court( Litigation)

Elite
Boutique
Boutique
Boutique
Focused

In addition to WTO work, many of the above firms work on trade remedy, export control, FTA
and other trade issues, in addition to the following other firms which provide a sampling of the
broader field of trade remedy law.
Trade Remedy (Antidumping, Countervailing Duty (Anti-Subsidy), Safeguards) Practice
Law firm
Amarchand Mangaldass
J. Sagar
APJSLG
Joseph Vellapally

Number of Lawyers
~600 lawyers
>200 lawyers
~ 50 lawyers
Senior Advocate, Supreme
Court( Litigation)

Typology
Elite
Elite
Boutique
Focused

A number of consulting firms such as AK Gupta and Ernst & Young also carry out trade
remedy, export control and consulting practice.
Customs, Customs valuation, export control, FTAs/Trade Agreements and Trade
Remedies
A K Gupta*
Ernst and Young

Accounting and Consulting Firm
‘Big 4’ (Accounting and Consulting Firm)

*Mr A K Gupta was a cost accountant at the DOC (DGAD), and handles the bulk of the trade
remedy work in India. E&Y recently established a “best friend firm” called PDS Legal to
establish this practice.
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Annex 2. India as a Complainant in WTO Disputes
Title of the case
Dispute
Year Panel
Number of
Establish
Cons ed
ultati
on
Poland- Automobile 19
1995 No
US- Women’s and 32
1996 Yes
Girl’s Wool Coats
US-Wool Shirts & 33
1996 Yes
Blouses

Appella
te Body

Sector
Concerned/
Trade
Association

No
No

Automobile
Textiles
and
Clothing
Textiles
and
Clothing

Yes

Lawyers
who
represented India

Turkey- Textiles

34

1996

Yes

Yes*

Textiles
and
Clothing
Fisheries/Mari Arthur
Appleton/
Lalive Lawyers
ne

US- Shrimp

58

1996

Yes

Yes*

EC- Rice
134
EC-Unbleached
140
Cotton Type Bed
Linen

1998
1998

No
No

No
No

Agriculture
Textiles
and Vermulst Waer &
Verhaeghe (VWV)
Clothing

EC-Bed Linen

141

1998

Yes

Yes*

Textiles
Clothing

South
Africa- 168
Pharmaceuticals
US- Steel Plate
206
US-Byrd
217
Amendment

1999

No

No

2000
2001

Yes
Yes

No
Yes**

Brazil- Jute Bags

2001

No

No

Argentina233
Pharmaceuticals
US- Textiles Rules 243
of Origin

2001

No

No

2002

Yes

No

and Vermulst Waer &
Verhaeghe (VWV)

(Texprocil)
Pharmaceutical
s
Steel
Sidley and Austin
Wilkie
Farr
n/a***
& Gallagher
(MPEDA/SEA (Advised
MPEDA/SEAI)
I)
Textiles
and
Clothing
Pharmaceutical
s
Textiles
and ACWL
Clothing
(Texprocil)
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EC- GSP

246

2002

Yes

Yes

Textiles
Clothing

and ACWL/Krishnan
Venugopal

(Texprocil)

EC- Steel Products
313
US- Customs Bond 345
Directive

2004
2006

No
Yes

No
Yes

Steel
Fisheries/Mari
ne

Squire Sanders
Krishnan
Venugopal/Clarus/
Wilkie Farr and
Gallagher

(MPEDA/SEA
I)
EU-Expiry Review 385
2008 No
No
Chemicals and (Consultation stage
of AD/CVD on PET
Krishnan
Plastics
Venugopal/ ACWL /
Steptoe & Johnson
(Chemplast)
assisted some of the
Indian exports
EU- Seizure of 408
2010 No
No
Pharmaceutical Consultation stage
Generic Drugs
s
Krishnan
Venugopal/
Frederick Abbot
Turkey- Transitional 428
2011 No
No
Lakshmikumaran
Textiles
Safeguards
and Sridharan
(Texprocil)
USCVD
on 436
2012 Yes
no
Steel
Lakshmikumaran
Carbon Steel
and Sridharan
*Article 21.5 panel established and the findings were appealed to the AB.
**Authorization for suspension of concession further to Arbitrator’s findings.
*** Not available. Multiple sector have been affected
Source: Compiled from information on the WTO website
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Annex 3. India as a Respondent in WTO Disputes
Title of the Disput Year
of Panel Appella
e
Consultati
case
te
Numbe on
r
Body
India- Patents 50
1996
Yes
Yes
(US)

India(EU)

Patents 79

Sector
concerned/
Association

Lawyers
who
represented India

Pharmaceutic Friedler
Roessler/
als
and Krishnan Venugopal
Chemicals

1996

Yes

No

90, 91, 1997
92, 93,
94, 95
and 96
India- Certain 120
1998
Commodities
IndiaAuto 146,
1997
(EC)
175

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Pharmaceutic
al
and
Chemicals
Agricultural,
Textiles and
Industrial
Products
Agriculture,
Leather
Automobile

IndiaImport 149
Restrictions
(EC)
India- Customs 150
Duties (EC)
IndiaEXIM 279
Policy EC)

1998

No

No

n/a**

1998

No

No

2003

No

No

India304
Antidumping on
Certain
Products (EC)
IndiaLead 306
Acid Batteries

2003

No

No

Agriculture
and
Chemicals
n/a*

2004

No

No

Chemicals

2004

No

No

n/a*

2006

No

No

Agriculture/W Economic
ine and Spirits Practice

India- QRs

(Bangladesh)
India318
Antidumping
Measures(Chine
se Taipei)
IndiaImport 352
Measures
on
Wines (EC)
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Friedler
Roessler/
Krishnan Venugopal
Friedler
Roessler/
Krishnan Venugopal

Friedler
Roessler
(ACWL)/ Krishnan
Venugopal

Laws

India360
2006
Yes
Yes
Agriculture/W
Additional
ine and Spirits
Duties (U.S)
India-Taxes on 380
2010
No
No
Agriculture/W
Wine
and
ine and Spirits
Spirits
IndiaImport 430
2012
Yes
No
Agriculture
Measures
on
Agriculture
products (US)
IndiaSolar 456
2013
No
No
Renewable
Cells and Solar
Energy
Modules
*Involved challenges against antidumping actions against various products
** Not available. Multiple sector have been affected
Source: Compiled from information on the WTO website
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Economic
Practice

Laws

Economic
Practice

Laws

Luthra &
Law offices

Clarus
Associates

Luthra

Law

